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Why do people and animals cooperate?

Figure: A beehive.

Figure: Chinese troops

Figure: Black lives matter

Our three cases

1. Bees
2. Chinese troops
3. BLM demonstrators

The reasons are different in the three cases.
1. Bees cooperate because they are all sisters who have the
same DNA. From a purely evolutionary point of view the
survival of one is the survival of all.
2. Chinese troops cooperate because they are obeying a single
commander.
3. Black lives people cooperate because they have a single
goal, and they have communicated to be together at one
time and place.

But communication is necessary. Even a master must tell his
servants what he wants them to do. BLM people must rely on
email or phone calls to coordinate about the time and place.
With bees, however, the “communication” is via millions of
years of evolution which is now part of their DNA.

Decision theory for groups

When an individual is about to make a decision she knows what
she knows, she (typically) has an idea of what her options are,
and she does not need to communicate with herself. I might
write a note to my future self but I do not usually write notes to
my current self.
But when a (human) group is considering alternatives of action,
it needs a certain amount of internal communication. Some
facts may be known to everyone, may be common knowledge, or
may be known only to a select few in a subgroup. In any case
some knowledge structure is crucial.

Similarly, when an action is to be taken, each member of the
group needs to do her part. But she also needs to know what
her part is and when she should perform it.
This is why an orchestra needs a conductor. Skilled musicians
will not perform well without one, although a string quartet does
not need one nor does a small group playing Indian classical
music.
These last are similar to Margaret Gilbert’s two people going for
a walk.

In Margaret Gilbert’s, example two people are going for a walk
together. If they are together, they can talk to each other or
perhaps one can read the other’s movements and follow suit.
The issue of communication will be simple. The bodily
movements will constitute the needed communication.
But complex issues will arise with large groups – like armies.
And they may arise also with small groups which are separated
by distance. If I am to pick you up at the airport so that we can
join a family picnic, you and I need to communicate when and
where I am to meet you.

But what about bees?

Do they communicate?

Dance Language of the Honey Bee
Social behavior in bees has a number of advantages. One of the most
important of these is the ability to quickly mobilize a large number of
foragers to gather floral resources that may only be available for a
short period of time. The ability to communicate location with such
precision is one of the most interesting behaviors of a very interesting
insect.
The recruitment of foragers from a hive begins when a scout bee
returns to the hive engorged with nectar from a newly found nectar
source. She begins by spending 30-45 seconds regurgitating and
distributing nectar to bees waiting in the hive. Once her generosity has
garnered an audience, the dancing begins. ....
In all cases the quality and quantity of the food source determines the
liveliness of the dances. If the nectar source is of excellent quality,
nearly all foragers will dance enthusiastically and at length each time
they return from foraging. Food sources of lower quality will produce
fewer, shorter, and less vigorous dances; recruiting fewer new foragers.

Proposal for a mesaure of coordination

For this talk we will put aside communication and simply
propose a measure of the amount of coordination. How much
coordination is there among bees? Among Chinese troops?
Among BLM activists? There should be a theory of a) the
amount of information among members of the group and b) the
basic similarity among agents which allows more coordination
with less communication. Schelling’s Focal Points make a good
example.

Consider n agents {1, ..., n}. Each agent has a (finite) action
space (or belief space) Ai . A profile of actions (or beliefs) is a
tuple (a1 , ..., an ) where each ai ∈ Ai .
We consider the set X of all theoretically possible profiles and
X = Πn1 (Ai ) : i = 1...n We also assume a set P of actually
possible profiles. If p ∈ P then it is possible that the agents act
in ways ai so that p = (a1 , .., an ) that is to say ai = (p)i
If some profile q is in X but not in P then we assume that the
agents do not jointly act in such a way that the action of agent i
is (q)i .

Suppose that ten people are doing a group dance and at some
stage they have to put one foot forward.
Then the theoretically possible profiles are where everyone puts
one foot forward either right or left just as he likes..
There are 210 theoretically posssible profiles.
But either a) everyone puts the right foot forward or b) everyone
puts the left foot forward. So there are only two actually
possible profiles.
The degree of coordination C is defined to be lg (α) where
α = (|X |/|P|)
|X | will generally be cardinalitiy of the set X and lg will be log
to the base 2.
In this case C is lg (210 /2) = lg (29 ) = 9

Another example. Suppose 1, 2, 3 are three agents and there are
actions a,b for each. a stands for “take care of the baby”, b for
“go to the beach”. Agent 1 would prefer b but will do a if
neither 2 nor 3 is taking care of the baby.
We could but need not think of this as a sequential game with
player 1 playing last.
Then P = {(a, b, b), (b, b, a), (b, a, b), (b, a, a)}
(b,b,b) is not in P. For 1 will do a if the other two are doing b.
Nor is (a,b,a). 1 prefers b to a, and will not do a if 3 is already
doing a.
Of the eight members of X Four are in P. Four are not.
So α is two and the degree of coordination C = 1. If P = X
then α would be 1 and C would be zero. If 1 did not care what
2 and 3 were doing then C would be zero.

The number C indicates the extent to which the actions of the
three agents are coordinated. The highest degree of coordination
arises when P is a singleton.
In this preliminary draft we will not ask why P is a singleton.
There could be many reasons and we will not - yet - go into the
various reasons.

Subgroups
Suppose that there are two subgroups of the set of agents and
for simplicity we will let them be G1 = {1, ..., m} and
G2 = {m + 1, ..., n}. Given a profile P of the whole group G we
let P1 = (p1 , .., pm ) and P2 = (pm+1 , ..., pn ) Abusing notation
we will write P = P1 + P2 .
Let P1 be the set of possible profiles of G1 and P2 be the set of
possible profiles of G2 . If P = {P + Q|P ∈ P1 and Q ∈ P2 } then
we will say that G1 and G2 are independent. This will clearly
happen iff |P| = |P1 | × |P2 |
We can also define the degree of coordination to be
lg (|(P1 | × |P2 )|/|P|). It will be 0 iff the two groups are
independent.

Another example. There are two kingdoms K and K0 .
There are three fruits available, apples, bananas and cherries.
King k likes apples and bananas but hates cherries. King k 0 likes
babanas and cherries but hates apples.
The king may choose whatever fruit he chooses among the ones
he likes but citizens are required to eat the same fruit as the
king. So the profile for K consists of {(a, ..., a), (b, .., b)}. For
K0 it is {(b, ..., b), (c, ...c)}.
Since the profiles are independent, there are four profiles for the
entire group, K + K0 . C is zero.

Suppose now that king k 0 is more powerful and demands that
the people of kingdom K eat the same fruit as the people of
kingdom K0 when possible.
Now kingdom K can still eat applies when K0 eats cherries
(since they do not have cherries) but are forbidden to eat apples
when K0 eats bananas. P1 and P2 remain the same as before
and have size 2 each, but the profile (a, ..., a, b, ..., b) vanishes.
P has size 3, α = 1.5 and C rises from 0 to 0.585.
The demand of king k 0 clearly requires communication. And we
conjecture that communication increases the value of C . If there
is no communication, then C must of necessity be 0.

Restrictions

A restriction r on P is a non-empty subset Q of P. We will
write Q = r (P). We may also think of r not as a particular
restriction but as a map from profiles to (sub)sets of profiles.

A system S of commands from king k 0 to kingdom K is a map
from P 0 to the set R of restrictions.
The intuition is that when K0 has a certain profile p then it
sends a restriction to K which shrinks the possible profiles for K.
An identity command at ease leaves P as it is.
Assuming that at least one of the commands is the identity, the
profile P stays as it is. But the joint profile of K and K0 may
shrink, raising the value of C .

We will say that r is at least as strict as r 0 if for all sets of
profiles P, r (P) ⊆ r 0 (P). It is more strict if for at least some
sets of profiles P, r (P) ⊂ r 0 (P). The system of commands S is
more strict than S 0 if all the restrictions in S are at least as
strict as those of S 0 and at least one is more strict.
Observation If S is more strict than S 0 then there is more
coordination with S than with S 0 .
There is obviously an algebra of restrictions. For instance there
could be a restriction on the speed at which you can drive and
also a restriction on the amount of alcohol you can imbibe
before driving. These two restrictions commute and the algebra
will be simpler.

Suppose that there are two religions in the same
community. We will call them H and M without intending
any particular meaning. They also have holidays, D for H
and R for M.
Most members of H observe D, but not all. Most
members of M observe R but not all. Also some members of
H observe R and some members of M observe D. Assume
that in each community, 70% observe their own holiday and
20% observe the holiday of the other community. Also 5%
in each community observe both holidays and that leaves
15% in each community who observe neither. Assuming the
communities to be of equal sizes, we can calculate the
degree of coordination within each community as well as the
coordination within the whole society.

We can also calculate the coordination between the two
communities.

Let us suppose that given a profile P it results in payoffs
ui = up,i to member i of the group. We would like to suggest
that ideally each group should coordinate its actions so as to
maximize the welfare of the whole group. But how do we define
the welfare W of the whole group?
We could let W (p) = Σn1 up,i But we would also like the various
ui to be reasonably equal. The sum does not enforce equality.
Rawls might define W (p) = n × µi (up,i ), where up,i is the
minimum. But that ignores every u which is not the minimum.
From Rawls’ point of view, a society of three in which the
incomes are 101,101,101 is better than a society with incomes
of 100,200,300 since the minimum in the first society is higher.

Limitations of rationality

Knowledge in Society
The following, possibly apocryphal story about the
mathematician Norbert Wiener, well known for his absent
mindedness, illustrates something even more subtle. At one
time the Wieners were moving and in the morning as he was
going to work, Mrs. Wiener said to him, “Now don’t come
home to this address in the evening.” And she gave him a
piece of paper with the new address. However, in the
evening Wiener found himself standing in front of the old
address and not knowing what to do – he had already lost
the slip of paper with the new address. He went to a little
girl standing by and said, “Little girl, do you know where
the Wieners have moved to?” The little girl replied, “Daddy,
Mom knew what would happen so she sent me to fetch
you.”

The moral of the story, for us, is that communication works only
if the memory of all parties involved is reliable.

Wimmer and Perner on beliefs about beliefs

Wimmer and Perner are concerned primarily with the perception
by children of other people’s mindsets. The following quote from
[WM] is a story about Maxi which they told a group of children:
Mother returns from her shopping trip. She bought
chocolate for a cake. Maxi may help her put away the
things. He asks her, “Where should I put the
chocolate?” “In the blue cupboard,” says the mother.

The story continues

Later, with Maxi gone out to play, the mother transfers the
chocolate from the blue cupboard to the green cupboard. Maxi
then comes back from the playground, hungry, and he wants to
get some chocolate.
In Wimmer and Perner’s experiment, little children who were
told the Maxi story were then asked the belief question, “Where
will Maxi look for the chocolate?”

Children at the age of three or less invariably got the answer
wrong and assumed that Maxi would look for the chocolate in
the green cupboard where they knew it was.
Even children aged four or five had only a one-third chance of
correctly answering this question or an analgous question
involving Maxi and his brother (who also wants the chocolate
and whom Maxi wants to deceive).
Children aged six or more were by contrast quite successful in
realizing that Maxi would think the chocolate would be in the
blue cupboard – where he had put it and that if he wanted to
deceive his brother, he would lead him towards the green
cupboard.

Thus it seems that representation of other people’s mindset
comes fairly late in childhood, well after they have learned to
deal with notions of belief and belief based action for themselves
and for others who share their own view of reality. In [St] Chris
Steinsvold investigates modal logics which are intended to
represent the states of mind of young children. See also [SP].
Older children are not much better. In an experiment in my
daughter’s seventh grade class, I found that they were unable to
deal with the muddy children puzzle beyond the first one or two
levels.
When there are shortcomings of rationality then the degree of
coordination will be less since some unintended profiles will
creep in.

The muddy children puzzle

In this by now well-known puzzle, a number of children are
playing in the mud and some of them get their foreheads dirty.
At this the father comes on the scene and announces, “at least
one of you has got her forehead dirty.”

Scenario 1: Suppose there is only one child, say Amy, who is
dirty. Then she will realize that her own forehead must be dirty
since she can see that the others are clean.
Scenario 2: Suppose now that there are two dirty children, Sarah
and Amy, who are asked in turn, “Do you know if your forehead
is dirty?” Now when Sarah is asked, she can see Amy’s dirty
forehead and she replies, “I don’t know.” However, when Amy is
asked, she is able to reason, “If my forehead were clean, Sarah
would have known that hers must be dirty since all the others are
clean. But Sarah did not know. So my forehead must be dirty.”

Scenario 1: Suppose there is only one child, say Amy, who is
dirty. Then she will realize that her own forehead must be dirty
since she can see that the others are clean.
Scenario 2: Suppose now that there are two dirty children, Sarah
and Amy, who are asked in turn, “Do you know if your forehead
is dirty?” Now when Sarah is asked, she can see Amy’s dirty
forehead and she replies, “I don’t know.” However, when Amy is
asked, she is able to reason, “If my forehead were clean, Sarah
would have known that hers must be dirty since all the others are
clean. But Sarah did not know. So my forehead must be dirty.”
This reasoning on Amy’s part requires a representation by Amy
of Sarah’s state of mind, and clearly Amy must be at least six
for this to work. However, Sarah herself must have some
reasoning ability and Amy must know that she has such abilities.
It is not enough for Amy to know Sarah’s view of reality, she
must also represent Sarah’s logical abilities in her own mind.

In particular, suppose that there are three dirty children –
Jennifer, Sarah, and Amy – who are asked in turn whether they
know if they are dirty, and with Amy being asked last.
If Sarah is only three, Amy would not be justified in concluding
from Sarah’s “I don’t know” that in that case, Amy herself must
be dirty.
Amy would need to know that if Amy were clean, Sarah would
have carried out a representation in her own mind of Jennifer’s
state of mind and concluded from Jennifer’s “I don’t know” that
Sarah must herself be dirty. But if Sarah is only three, Amy
cannot rely on such reasoning on Sarah’s part.

As the number of dirty children increases, there is a need for
higher and higher levels of “I know that he knows that she
knows that....” Common knowledge is at the end of this road
and has been offered as the explanation of co-ordinated
behaviour ([Lew, HM, CM, Chw]).
For instance Halpern and Moses in [HM] show that the
co-ordinated attack problem requires common knowledge
between the two generals, and that given the means of
communication they have, such common knowledge is impossible
to attain. Clark and Marshall [CM2] indicate similar difficulties
with the referent of “the movie playing at the Roxy today.”

Conclusion

We have indicated some complex issues about the identity and
workings of a group. While groups of humans, formed
consciously, may involve some prior deliberation, other groups
arise for other reasons. And even humans may not deliberate
rationally.
Much work remains to be done.

Thanks very much for listening!

